University of Portland

Pilot Scholars
Philosophy Faculty Publications and Presentations

Philosophy

2016

A Subjectivist Solution to the Problem of Harm in
Genetic Enhancement
Sruthi Rothenfluch
University of Portland, rothenfl@up.edu

Follow this and additional works at: http://pilotscholars.up.edu/phl_facpubs
Part of the Ethics and Political Philosophy Commons, and the Genetics and Genomics
Commons
Citation: Pilot Scholars Version (Modified MLA Style)
Rothenfluch, Sruthi, "A Subjectivist Solution to the Problem of Harm in Genetic Enhancement" (2016). Philosophy Faculty
Publications and Presentations. 5.
http://pilotscholars.up.edu/phl_facpubs/5

This Journal Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Philosophy at Pilot Scholars. It has been accepted for inclusion in Philosophy
Faculty Publications and Presentations by an authorized administrator of Pilot Scholars. For more information, please contact library@up.edu.

Journal of
Cognition
and
Neuroethics
A Subjectivist Solution to the Problem of Harm
in Genetic Enhancement
Sruthi Rothenfluch
University of Portland

Biography
Sruthi Rothenfluch is a visiting instructor of philosophy at the University of Portland in Oregon. She completed
her doctorate at the University of Nebraska-Lincoln in 2011, working primarily within epistemology. Her
current research centers on the ethics of involuntary medical intervention as this applies to pre-natal genetic
enhancement and psychiatric treatment. Her previous work within contextualism and virtue epistemology,
which addressed differences between expert and lay deliberation and judgment, raised more practical questions
about the content of expert claims and whether they ought to be invariably accepted. This led her to examine
conditions under which treatments may be permissible or even obligatory in the absence of consent.
Publication Details
Journal of Cognition and Neuroethics (ISSN: 2166-5087). January, 2016. Volume 3, Issue 4.
Citation
Rothenfluch, Sruthi. 2016. “A Subjectivist Solution to the Problem of Harm in Genetic Enhancement.” Journal of
Cognition and Neuroethics 3 (4): 113–130.

A Subjectivist Solution to the Problem of Harm
in Genetic Enhancement
Sruthi Rothenfluch

Abstract
Some have recently argued that parents are morally obligated, under certain circumstances, to use pre-natal
genetic intervention as a means of enhancement. Despite aiming to benefit the child, such intervention may
produce serious and irreparable harm. In these cases, parents seem to have an obligation not to intervene,
as such efforts make the child worse off. Julian Savulesu has argued that while harm raises doubts about the
acceptability of genetic enhancement, genetic selection remains an obligation. This claim, however, rests on
an indefensible privileging of personal over impersonal harm. I propose instead that we reframe the debate as
stemming from fundamentally different views about parental obligation. The objection from harm rests on an
objectivist conception, according to which obligation is determined by all relevant facts, including unpredictable
harm. Proponents of genetic enhancement, however, operate within subjectivist assumptions about obligation,
according to which moral requirements are determined by reasons that are epistemically accessible to the
relevant agents. I will argue here that because subjectivism offers a more reasonable conception of parental
obligation, such unforeseeable harm does not remove a parent’s obligation to enhance.
Keywords
Genetic Enhancement, Genetic Selection, Subjectivism, Harm, Procreative Beneficence

I. Introduction
While the ethical status of pre-natal genetic enhancements is far from settled,
both supporters and opponents of such technology view the child’s interests and safety
as central to the debate. Opponents often cite harm to the child in terms of loss of
autonomy and distortion of the parent-child relationship as reasons against enhancement
(Sandel 2007) while Julian Savulescu and other proponents emphasize ways in which
enhancement will improve the quality of a child’s life. Rather than unrestricted
approval of all such interventions, the latter generally acknowledge the permissibility of
enhancement under certain specified conditions, in particular, those cases in which we
have strong evidence that more good will come about as a result of enhancement than
without it.1 These goods have been fleshed out in positive and negative ways, citing
both the best interests of the recipient, and the absence of conflicting considerations
1.

Brock 2009; Buchanan et al 2000; Robertson 2001
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such as parents’ impaired ability to care for existing children, and harmful impacts on
the wider society. Savulescu has argued that under certain conditions, prenatal genetic
interventions are not only permissible, but required, on par with providing nutrition,
education and shelter.2 While this might reek of a move towards eugenics, Savulescu and
others, as will be shown below, do not endorse a narrowly defined conception of a good
life, but instead remain neutral on this question. Despite its merits, the position appears
susceptible to a certain kind of charge: suppose that as a result genetic enhancement, you
produce a child who is predisposed to asthma, or worse, cancer. In such cases, it appears
that the child’s life turned out worse due to intervention. Savulescu (2001, 2006) appeals
to a person-affecting sense of harm to argue that while genetic enhancement may harm
the child, selection will not. This is because selecting an embryo with genes predisposed
to serious illness does not make that child any worse. If parents had selected an embryo
without that genetic structure, it would have been a different child. Therefore, since the
child is not worse than she would have been, no harm has been done to that child. Such
a view of harm is overly restrictive in that it precludes, (or, at best, fails to appreciate the
severity of) genuine instances of harm. Instead of denying that intervention causes harm,
I propose that the best way to understand and respond to the objection is to expose
its objectivist underpinnings. Harm that was not and could not have been reasonably
predicted can count against an act only if all relevant facts determine its moral status.
Because parental obligations are best determined subjectively, that is, according to facts
parents can access, the obligation to enhance can be sustained in such cases.
I begin in the second section by presenting Savulescu’s extensive defense of the
moral obligation to enhance, supporting and supplementing his view at times with
others’ whose positions strongly resemble his own. As I largely agree with Savulescu, I
will go some way towards clarifying and defending his position. Next, I will present a case
that is representative of the worry described above and explain Savulescu’s response that
selection is immune from this objection. I will, however, contend that his strategy fails to
adequately address the problem. In the final section, I will present my own proposal for
re-assessing the debate as one instance of the larger subjectivist-objectivist divide within
metaethics. I will argue that because parental obligations are determined subjectively, the
objection from harm cannot displace our obligation to use ethical genetic enhancements.
I will end by addressing some apparently problematic cases for my view.

2.

Savulescu and Kahane 2009; Savulescu 2010, 2009, 2001; Harris 2010
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II. Principle of Procreative Beneficence (PB)
Savulescu and Kahane (2009) endorse what they call the ‘Principle of Procreative
Beneficence’ (PB), one version of which is given here:
If couples (or single reproducers) have decided to have a child, and
selection is possible, then they have a significant moral reason to select
the child, of the possible children they could have, whose life can be
expected, in light of the relevant available information, to go best or at
least not worse than any of the others. (274)3
The basic principle here is not difficult to understand or support, insofar as it encourages
parents to aim at having the best child possible, something that parents routinely do
outside of genetic intervention. Savulescu (2009b) has argued that because genetic
enhancements are relevantly similar to environmental enhancements in their effects
and expectations, the two are morally equivalent. I will not rehearse his arguments here
because my chief concern is whether an obligation to enhance can be sustained against
the objection from harm. There are some aspects, however, that call for clarification
before we can proceed. First, we might ask what constitutes the best life. Rather than
favoring a particular conception of a good life, Savulescu argues that certain traits will
promote one’s ability to achieve wellbeing, and others will detract from this ability, across
various reasonable conceptions of a good life, including desire satisfaction, objective list,
and hedonistic. Chronic pain, for example, would undeniably make life worse, while an
increase in memory would enhance nearly any plan of life; the ability to control violent
outbursts would enable individuals to maintain meaningful social relationships and
retain their dignity and independence; intelligence would promote wellbeing whether
it is through being able to imagine various pleasures, or choosing the most effective
means to satisfy one’s ends (2001, 420). According to Savulescu, parents are obligated to
select children whose traits can be expected to best achieve wellbeing according to such
theories, where selection is possible.
Savulescu further argues that enhancements that close off reasonable goods and
opportunities are not acceptable. It is important to parse this carefully because at first
glance, it seems obvious that parents will prize and pursue certain goods at the expense
of others. Some parents might emphasize being prudential and moral agents, thereby
encouraging development of virtues necessary for coping with the contingencies of life
and treating others with respect and kindness. Such parents might enlist their children in
3.

An earlier version of this principle appears in Savulescu (2001).
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religious training or participation in community service. Other parents might be invested
in developing intellectual capacity and have their children participate in chess clubs or
math teams.4 How then should we understand this restriction? Proponents of genetic
enhancement appeal to Joel Feinberg’s (1980) ‘rights in trust’, which ensure “the child’s
right to an open future”. These rights must be preserved for children even though they
lack the capacities to exercise them now.5 The idea here is that children have a negative
claim against parents that they not intervene in their lives in a way that forecloses on
their opportunities in the future. Thus, even though a child cannot now exercise her right
of reproduction, parents cannot take measures to deprive her of this possibility. Such
prohibitive conditions are echoed in Buchanan et al.:
it would be wrong for parents substantially to close off most
opportunities that would otherwise be available to their children in
order to impose their own particular conception of a good life or in
order to continue their own community that is committed to that
conception of a good life.6
Larry Herzberg (2007) notes that the obligation to enhance should be constrained by an
autonomy-respecting condition that also
prohibits any enhancement that would result in the creation of a
person with fewer rationally desirable life-options, or with less of a
cognitive ability to choose between them, than would otherwise have
been the case. For instance, it prohibits enhancements that would make
particular occupations harder for the person with the enhanced trait to
choose or pursue, even if it would make other occupations easier. (100)
While parents may encourage certain activities or life styles, they cannot intervene in
ways that eliminate the ability to exercise certain rights. For example, rights in trust
4.

Such differences are highlighted by Buchanan et al in their discussion of the extent of freedom parents have
in raising their children. (2000, 158).

5.

Feinberg’s original division of rights is made in the legal context, specifically, to determine whether or not
the state should prevent parents from foreclosing children’s futures in some way, say, whether they can, due
to religious conviction or cultural tradition, prevent their children from attending school or receiving blood
transfusions. Feinberg’s distinction has, however, also proved useful and relevant to the ethical boundaries
between parent involvement and a child’s autonomy, and has been utilized by a number of authors in the
area including but not limited to Dena Davis, Michael Sandel, William Buchanan and Norman Daniels.

6.

Buchannan et al. From Chance to choice, 170
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would prohibit a deaf couple from using genetic therapy or selection to produce a deaf
child. While this would create a strong bond within family members and even the deaf
community, the act will nevertheless foreclose certain opportunities for the child. In
her (2010), Davis explains that the child “will have only very limited options to move
outside of that culture…. [confining] her forever to a narrow group of people and a
limited choice of careers ” (82). More needs to be said about the type of rights involved
and what, specifically, counts as infringement, but the principle’s prohibitive message is
sufficiently clear for our purpose.
A second point of clarification concerns Savulescu’s use of ‘significant moral reason’,
which is to be read as a qualified obligation. More precisely, “when the obligation to
have such a child is not overridden by sufficiently strong opposing moral reasons, it
will be true that parents ought, all things considered, to select the most advantaged
child” (2009, 278). We can acquire a more precise idea of what counts as competing
normative reasons, from Savulescu’s (2009) criteria for an ethical enhancement. An
ethical enhancement is not only in the child’s best interest in that it is expected to be
reasonably safe and beneficial, but also cannot unreasonably restrict the range of possible
lives open to her, directly harm others through excessive costs, or reinforce and increase
unjust inequality and discrimination.7 These clarifications allow us to define Savulescu’s
position more perspicuously: Parents have an all-things-considered obligation to use
ethical enhancements.
III. The Objection from Harm and Savulescu’s Response
As shown above, proponents of pre-natal genetic enhancements cautiously limit
their approval to ethical enhancements: those that can be expected to benefit the child
according to different conceptions of a good life without causing harm to the child, family
or wider society. Such constraints address a number of concerns that have previously been
raised against the use of genetic technology. A pluralistic understanding of a good life,
along with deliberate attention to the child’s future interests respond to concerns about
the return of 20th century eugenics and threats to the child’s autonomy. However, these
conditions do not speak to a different sort of worry. Despite careful efforts to secure
the child’s wellbeing, enhancements may misfire by seriously harming the child. This is
especially troubling for non-disease cases, because such children might have lived entirely
normal, albeit unenhanced, lives. Suppose scientists discover a correlation between

7.

For some discussion of possible exceptions, see Savulescu 2010.
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enzyme E and greater attention span, which by and large, has been identified as a
desirable cognitive skill. Geneticists have isolated the gene responsible for the production
of this enzyme and have discovered a way to introduce the gene to existing embryos. P
opts to enhance her child in this way, reasoning that this will increase the likelihood of
the child's wellbeing without creating significant hardship for others. The enhancement
is ethical in Savulescu’s terms. Suppose that in so doing, P inadvertently removes certain
other desirable traits such as spontaneity, or worse, generates a predisposition to cancer.
P has harmed her child by making her worse off than she otherwise would have been,
despite meeting the conditions of an ethical enhancement. Note that this is not akin to
cases in which parents have intervened to treat or prevent some catastrophic illness. If P
had done nothing at all, the child would have a species-normal attention span and been
spared a potentially deadly illness. Contra Savulescu and others, it seems that P ought not
to have used the ethical enhancement.
Savulescu (2001, 2006) defends genetic intervention by distinguishing selection
from enhancement. Enhancement involves the alteration of particular genes, through
gene therapy (gene insertion into gametes or embryos) or gene surgery, (where
undesirable genes are deactivated) (Buchanan et al. 2000). Selection, on the other hand,
is carried out through analysis of the embryo via in vitro fertilization or pre-natal testing
through chorionic villus sampling, amniocentesis and ultrasound. The difference is that
enhancement operates on a given embryo, whereas selection is a screening process
that enables parents to select the embryo that contains traits they desire. Suppose that
Lisa was selected via in vitro fertilization because she possessed genes correlated with
increased attention span. But Lisa also has a genetic predisposition to cancer. According
to Savulescu, the parents have not harmed Lisa. If instead the parents had chosen an
embryo with a different genetic blueprint (one who both lacked the desirable traits and
cancer), then Lisa would not have been born. So long as Lisa’s life is worth living at all,
the parents have not harmed Lisa because they have not made Lisa’s life worse than it
would have been.8 Suppose instead that parents altered Lisa’s genetic structure in a way
that enabled greater attention span, but in so doing caused Lisa to develop cancer. Here,
Savulescu argues that parents harmed Lisa by making her life worse off than it would

8.

McMahan (1997) further points out that because Lisa’s life is worth living, parents have benefitted the
child: “Indeed, if it is bad for a child to be caused to exist with a life that is not worth living, then it seems
that by parity of reasoning, it should be good for a child to be caused to exist with a life that is worth
living”. (12)
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have been without the intervention. Since harm-to-the-child is what is at issue, selection
appears immune to this objection whereas enhancement does not.
Savulescu adopts what he (following Parfit) calls a person-affecting view of harm,
according to which a person is harmed by an act if she is made worse off than she would
have otherwise been. The person-affecting view of harm is plausible because we tend to
think that harm occurs when (i)a particular individual or set of individuals is affected and
(ii)when this individual or set of individuals is comparatively worse because of the act.9
Parfit (1973, 1984) and subsequent writers have presented cases in which it seems right
to say that harm occurs even if a particular individual or set of individuals is not made
worse off, generating the non-identity problem. In his (1984), Parfit discusses a 14-year
old girl who is told that if she waits a few years to have her child, she will give it a better
life (358). She decides to ignore this advice and have the child, who has a difficult start,
one that is much more difficult than if she had waited a few years. While it seems right
for the girl to have waited, we cannot say that her act was worse for her child. This is
because had she waited, this child would not have existed at all, and because this child’s
life is worth living, the girl’s decision was not worse for this child. The person-affecting
view of harm results in the odd conclusion that the mother has not committed harm.10
The worry is also illustrated in McMahan’s (1997) ‘first preconception variant’:
A couple are considering having a child but suspect that one of them
may be the carrier of a genetic defect that causes moderately severe
mental retardation or cognitive disability. They therefore seek to be
screened for the defect. The physician who performs the screening is
negligent, however, and assures the couple that there is no risk when in

9.

Savulescu offers a counter-factual explanation of harm: A has been harmed when A is made worse off
than she would otherwise have been if the act had not been performed. This characterization seems
problematic. Suppose that Max stabs Lisa with a knife. I’m inclined to think that Max harmed Lisa even if,
given Lisa’s circumstances, if Max had not stabbed her, she would have been stabbed by someone else, or
suffered a knife accident. While I think that this is a relevant concern, I will not pursue it here because the
focus of my argument is not this aspect, but what is identified in (i): the target of harm.

10. Curiously, Savulescu argues that his own remarks on selection “echoes” and, draws from, Parfit’s nonidentity problem. I take it that this is because selecting an embryo with better prospects for wellbeing
is similar to waiting to have a child with better prospects for wellbeing. However, Savulescu’s own view
crucially departs from Partfit’s in that when an act results in a worse outcome that involves a different
person, Savulescu’s view cannot acknowledge that this act has produced harm, or at least does not
adequately appreciate the severity of the harm.
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fact the man is a carrier of the defect. As a result, the couple conceives
a child with moderately severe cognitive impairments.
If the physician had screened the couple properly, a single sperm would have been
isolated and genetically altered to correct the defect, which would have been combined
in vitro with an egg drawn from the womb. This would have resulted in a child without
cognitive disability, and, importantly, have been an altogether different child. So long
as the child naturally conceived has a life worth living, the negligent physician’s act was
not worse for this child, and therefore, according to the person-affecting principle, the
physician has not committed harm.
These cases suggest that a person-affecting conception of harm is insufficient. We
need a different conception to accommodate our intuition that the physician and 14-yrold caused harm. Parfit proposes Q:
If in either of two possible outcomes the same number of people would
ever live, it would be worse if those who live are worse off, or have a
lower quality of life, than those who would have lived. (360)
McMahan calls this the Impersonal Comparative Principle, comparative not because it
makes a single individual worse off, but rather because a different course of action would
have secured the same goods (same number of lives) without the suffering that resulted
from the original act:
The objection to causing the [cognitively impaired] child to exist is that
it was possible to cause a different child to exist whose life would have
contained at least as much good but less of what is bad—in particular,
less overall suffering (1997, 32)
This principle also accounts for the harm committed by the 14-yr-old, as she could have
had a child without the suffering experienced by the original child. (It is important to
highlight that the view is restricted to same number choices, and therefore does not claim
that it is wrong or worse to bring about a child with disabilities when it was not possible
for a couple to have a child without disabilities.11) Impersonal harm appears plausible, and
subsequently renders selection equally susceptible to the objection from harm.

11. While McMahan endorses the impersonal comparative principle, which he attributes to Parfit, he does not
support Parfit’s no difference view between person-affecting and impersonal harms. Instead, he argues that
impersonal harms can only be as strong as, but never greater than, person-affecting harms.
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Savulescu (2006) contends that personal harms will always be worse than impersonal
harms. Imagine for instance, a child who discovers that her genes have been altered. She
might reason that were it not for her parents’ intrusion, she would have existed quite
differently, thereby resenting her parents and developing an embittered attitude toward
life. This stinging realization, however, cannot occur to an individual that has been
selected. Where does this leave us? Savulescu argues that selection is more defensible
against the harm objection, arguing in fact that selection is more immune “regardless of
how misguided the parents’ genetic choices may turn out to be, provided only that the
child has a life worth living” (164).
Note that Savulescu has stopped short of fully addressing the problem of harm,
instead arguing that enhancement is more problematic than selection. This is unsatisfying
for two reasons. First, the difference in suffering Savulescu cites will be small, or at
any rate insignificant, in the type of case presented above, where genetic intervention
resulted in serious harm. Suppose that Lisa1 was a product of selection and Lisa2 a product
of genetic therapy, and both develop cancer. It seems that Lisa2’s resentment towards
her parents will pale in comparison to the physical and emotion toil of fighting cancer,
making both their suffering roughly equal. Further, Lisa2 may not even be aware that
her parents’ intervention was responsible for her disease, which would also make their
suffering comparable. Second and more importantly, Savulescu has failed to explain why
parents are obligated to perform ethical enhancements despite causing such suffering.
IV. A Subjectivist Solution
We cannot deny that genetic intervention caused significant harm in both cases. The
question now is whether such harm removes a parent’s obligation to ethically enhance.
The problem is best viewed as an application of a much broader debate in metaethics
concerning the nature of obligation. According to objectivists, one’s obligation, what
one ought to do, is determined by all relevant normative facts. Subjectivists, on the
other hand, maintain that one’s obligation is determined by normative facts that are
in some way epistemically accessible to the agent. Proponents of genetic enhancement
support their view on the basis of expected benefits, adopting a thoroughly subjectivist
perspective. Consider Savulescu and Kahane’s (2009) remarks on decision-making:
When we make decisions, the option we should choose is the
one which maximizes expected value. In the case of selection and
reproductive decision-making, the outcome of interest should be how
well a new person’s whole life goes, that is, well-being. PB thus states
122
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that we have reason to select the child who is expected to have the
most advantaged life. We cannot know which child will have the best
life. (278)
John Harris (2010) writes, “parents would act ethically if they were to attempt to
achieve such an [enhancement] for their children”. Here is Buchanan et al. (2000): “It is
morally desirable or morally good for parents to use a variety of means, including genetic
interventions to attempt to produce the best children possible” (162). 12 Even given our
best efforts, children may in fact not live a better life as a result of such interventions, as
Savulescu and Kahane note:
Those born with the greatest gifts and talents may squander them
while those born to great hardship may overcome enormous obstacles
to lead to the best of lives. It is not surprising that there are such limits
on what prospective parents can reasonably hope to achieve through
genetic selection (278)
In contrast, the objection from harm is rooted in the view that one’s obligation is
determined by all relevant normative facts, including the actual outcome, reflecting
objectivism. Because in the cases under consideration the resulting individuals were made
worse off, opponents argue that parents are obligated to not intervene.
Whether such harm removes an obligation to ethically enhance, then, will depend on
the conception of obligation we favor. 13 If we reject objectivism, then such harms—facts
that could not have been reasonably predicted—cannot count against the obligation
to enhance. I want to suggest that we have good reason to adopt subjectivism in the
context of parental obligation, if not more widely. It is in this way that obligation can

12. Buchanan et al. do not endorse an obligation to intervene, but accept that the permissibility of intervention
is based on our attempts to produce the best children possible, not that such efforts do result in the best
children possible.
13. As stated above, this is an application of a meta-ethical debate regarding the nature of moral obligation,
specifically (a)whether moral obligations are restricted to reasons an agent possesses and if so, (b)what
kind of epistemic constraints are relevant to possession. Much has been said historically and in more
recent literature: Graham 2010, Lord forthcoming, 2010 and 2013, Schroeder 2008, 2009. My concern
is strictly in its application to genetic enhancements and therefore will have limited bearing on the
broader debate. However, such concrete application is helpful in both a theoretical and practical sense.
This particular context testifies to the strength of the subjectivist position, and therefore goes some way
towards furthering the dialectic. Second, some of the points raised in the larger meta-ethical discussion
seem particularly well suited to the situation parents face in making reproductive decisions.
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serve as a practical guide in deliberations of what we ought to do. When we have strong
evidence that placing children in highly reputed schools will enable them to achieve their
goals, we see this as reason for doing so. Because we justifiably believe that vaccinations
will protect them from disease, we immunize. Buchanan et al. (2000) point out, that
“parents are expected to… keep their children away from drugs, from street crime,
from hazardous play…. heed nutritional and dietary concerns” because we have “some
claims to know scientifically what is best for children” (157). Parental duties are, in other
words, constrained by facts that can shape and direct our moral deliberation, those which
are epistemically accessible. The importance of epistemic access to obligation is nicely
captured in Errol Lord’s recent defense of subjectivism.
Lord argues that an obligation to φ requires possessing the right reasons in favor of
φ-ing. His argument is based on two premises:
1.

S has an obligation to φ only if S has the ability to φ for the right
reasons.

2.

S has the ability to φ for the right reasons only if S possesses the
right reasons. (9)

He argues, first, that an agent has an obligation to φ only if she can φ for the right
reasons, what he calls the right reasons ability condition. A right reason is understood
in terms of normative facts, or facts that recommend actions. What does it mean to act
for the right reasons and why is this ability necessary for obligation? Acting for the right
reason requires that the agent’s act be explained and justified by her reason and that she
is appropriately sensitive to the relationship between the fact and the act. Suppose that
Lou believes that a nearby private school will better prepare her child for college than
the public school alternative, and therefore decides to send her daughter there. But Joan
decides to send her daughter there because it affords her a certain prestige. Note that
the child’s wellbeing both explains and justifies Lou’s act. Joan’s act is explained but not
justified by her reason. Further, if it were not the case that private school better prepared
her child, Lou would probably not enroll her daughter there, though Joan would. For
these reasons, only Lou has acted according to the right reasons. Why is this ability a
necessary condition for an obligation? It must be possible for the agent to act according
to her obligation in a non-lucky or non-accidental way. If we reject the right reasons
ability condition, and instead accept that an agent’s obligation to φ does not require an
ability to φ for the right reasons,
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there would be cases where you ought to φ even though the reasons
that make this true cannot get any legitimate grip on you—i.e., they
cannot move you in a non-accidental way. In these cases you will have
to get lucky in order to do what you ought. (11)
If one has an obligation to φ, but it is not the case that one can φ for the right reasons,
then the rationale for φ-ing is completely out of one’s epistemic grasp. This means that
if she were to φ, she would do what she ought as a matter of pure chance or luck. This is
doubly suspect because in such cases it is impossible to praise or assign credit to the agent
despite doing exactly what she ought to do.
Lord goes on to argue that acting according to the right reasons requires possessing
the right reasons, characterizing possession as bearing a positive epistemic relation to
the reason. S possesses a reason r if she is in a position to justifiably access r without
a significant change in her epistemic situation. What this amounts to in the case of
inferential beliefs is that you could come to have a justified belief that r if you could
and did attend to the contents of your existing beliefs and formed the belief in the
right way. In the case of non-inferential beliefs, you have some experiences such that
if you could and did attend to certain features of those experiences, and formed the
belief r in the right way, you would have a justified belief that r. Note that this means
that the agent does not in fact have to know or believe that r, but only that she would
be able to come to believe it. 14 Possession is a necessary condition for acting for the
right reasons since in order to act for the right reasons, the facts must be epistemically
available to you. A reason cannot explain and justify your act if you are unaware and
cannot become aware of the reason. Lord’s argument provides strong support for the
view that an agent’s obligation is determined by facts accessible to her by emphasizing
the intuitive link between obligation and deliberative capacity. That is, an agent must not
only be physically, but also deliberatively capable of acting according to her obligation.
What, then, does this tell us about genetic enhancements? Insofar as the harm caused by
genetic intervention was not foreseeable, it cannot create an obligation to refrain from

14. There are two ways in which my remarks depart from Lord’s position. First, Lord presents both an epistemic
and what he calls treatment condition as requirements for possession, but my focus will be limited to the
former. There are two reasons for this. I want to focus on the importance of epistemic limitations when it
comes to the obligation to enhance. In addition, I don’t think that Lord makes a particularly strong case
for the need for a treatment condition. Second, Lord argues that agents must be in a position to know the
relevant reason. I think, however, that this is too strong. I argue only that parents must be in a position to
have a justified belief that the enhancement in question is expected to promote the child’s wellbeing.
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intervention. This is because an obligation to φ requires possessing normative facts in
favor of φ –ing. Harm to the child in the cases considered here, however, was not within
the agents’ epistemic ken, and therefore cannot affect their obligation to enhance.
While subjectivism appears to correctly incorporate our epistemic limitations, some
might worry that it fails to recognize genuine obligations, say in the case of parents who
are very poorly epistemically situated:
Influenza
While the flu is typically unpleasant and inconvenient, some strains can
be fatal, especially to very young children and the elderly. Researchers
uncover a particular gene that helps to immunize the body against
all strains of the virus, making it the case that those who have this
gene, either naturally or through genetic therapy, will, in all likelihood
never have the flu. This not only eliminates some very uncomfortable
experiences, but could potentially save lives. Prospective parents U,
despite having the resources to use genetic enhancements, are not
aware of these expected results and cannot become aware, as the news
has not reached their rather small and isolated community.
We intuit that U has significant moral reason to enhance their child so that she is not
susceptible to a potentially lethal virus. Because subjectivism determines obligation
according to reasons that are epistemically accessible to subjects, it cannot recognize U’s
obligation to use such an enhancement. What is more worrisome is if subjectivism might
lead to the following sort of case:
Education
Suppose that Parents A live in a modern and highly-developed society.
But they belong to a smaller community within this society in which
schooling is strongly discouraged. There is a deeply entrenched and
widespread belief that formal education leads to moral deterioration
and inhibits cognitive development by encouraging a sort of intellectual
dependency on others. As a result many adults in this community end
up without financial security, career options, etc.
We intuit that parents A, despite their beliefs, should send their children to school, just
as parents U, should enhance their child with the anti-flu gene. These cases, however,
are importantly different. In Influenza, parents do not have access to information about
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the gene. That is, there is nothing about their sensory experience or prior beliefs that
can allow them to infer the obligation to enhance their child. Parents in the second case,
however, have evidence that depriving children of education decreases the likelihood of
achieving a good life. Because they are in a position to form a justified belief about the
benefits of schooling, they are morally obligated to provide education for their children
according to subjectivism.
One might, however, argue that regardless of U’s epistemic position, they are
required to affix their child with the anti-flu gene. While it is clear that it would be best
to genetically intervene, what parents ought to do will diverge from what is best in
these cases. This is because obligation must be constrained by an agent’s capacity, which
includes both physiological and deliberative abilities. While the endangered status of
humpback whales gives us reason to protest whale hunting, which may result in a state
of affairs that is overall better than what would occur if we did not protest, such reasons
cannot obligate us to participate unless we are both physiologically and deliberatively
capable of acting on this reason. If one is required, regardless of such abilities, to always
achieve the best possible circumstances, this would in fact engender a highly implausible
set of ‘oughts’.
Another reason that one might believe that subjectivism does not generate the
right verdict is because how we might advise parents. It is clear that if U were to ask
our advice, we would counsel them in favor of the relevant enhancement, without first
considering their epistemic status. This is nicely brought into relief by Graham (2010):
The question I want answered when I ask myself what my moral
obligations are is the same as that which I want answered when, in
seeking your help, I ask you what they are; but, to adequately answer
me you don’t need to consider my evidence concerning my situation;
therefore, my moral obligations don’t depend on my evidence
concerning my situation. (91)
And again here by Thomson (1986):
On those rare occasions on which someone conceives the idea of
asking for my advice on a moral matter, I do not take my field work
to be limited to a study of what he believes is the case: I take it to be
incumbent on me to find out what is the case. (179)
Given that we would advise parents U to provide the anti-flu enhancements, it might be
argued that moral obligation is not limited by epistemic constraints.
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This conclusion does not follow. Following Lord, I want to say that this has to do
with the semantic referent of ‘ought’, which is not univocal. Rather, ‘ought’ statements
are relativized to different bodies of information. We can ask what parents A ought to
do from the body of information salient and accessible to them, and we can ask what
parents ought to do from the body of information salient and accessible to us as their
advisers. Though different, both will be true relative to our unique information. Our
judgments do not establish U’s moral obligation from their limited epistemic position.
This would of course change once U were able to access the relevant truths.
Conclusion
I have argued here that we cannot respond to the problem of harm by denying
that certain forms of genetic intervention cause harm or claiming that some cause less
harm than others. A more effective strategy is to recognize that this is fundamentally a
disagreement about how to approach parental obligation. The objection from harm raises
doubts about the obligation to use ethical enhancements only if we accept that obligation
is determined by all relevant facts. I have argued, however, that it is more reasonable to
accept a subjectivist view of parental obligation. Subjectivism accommodates the intuitive
link between deliberative capacity and obligation, and as such, reflects our judgment
about parental obligation outside of the context of genetic enhancement. For this reason,
actual and unforeseeable harm cannot remove our obligation to intervene.
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